Introduction
West European polities are in a state of flux. Not only have the actors diversified but so have the issues of contention and modes of competition (Katz and Mair, 2002) .
Mainstream parties are thus subject to a novel set of challengers (Harmel and Gibson, 1995) but also have to deal with the imminent sense of ideological crisis as the conversation shifts from 'visions' to 'competence' (van der Brug, 2004) .
The nature of party systems, and especially their dimensionality, has consequently received substantial attention. The literature has scrutinised whether contestation takes place along single, dual or multiple cleavages (Enyedi and DeeganKrause, 2010) , and whether ownership -rather than spatial -competition is becoming more prominent . These changes are likely to impact on the strength of party/electorate linkages (Dalton, 2002) ; on party stances (Dinas and Gemenis, 2010) , and on the relevance of ideology in the political 'game' (Enyedi, 2008) . The immigration 'issue' is one of those new matters that is particularly challenging for scholars and parties alike. It not only has a disruptive effect on left-right classifications (Benoit and Laver 2007) but also follows a logic of its own as to when parties decide to make it a top election priority (Dahlström and Esaiasson, 2011) and/or to change their positions (Breunig and Luedtke, 2008 ).
Yet surprisingly, less is said about the potential effects that multidimensionality has on party competition, especially on thorny issues like immigration.
The lack of scholarly attention is attributed to some of the assumptions made. One posits that parties may very well exist in multi-dimensional spaces but competition continues to be uni-dimensional (van der Brug and van Spanje, 2009 ). Another suggests that the liberal -restrictive axis (regarding immigration control) maps onto the left -right continuum (Bale, 2003) . But such conclusions do not fully address two important issues. If party systems are characterised by a single fault line, why is the centre-left, but not the centre-right, 'caught between ideology and strategy' when competing on immigration (Alonso and Claro da Fonseca, 2012: 866) ? And why would the left also push a restrictive line (Hinnfors et al, 2012) ?
This article suggests that not only are party systems characterised by multidimensionality and increased flux but so is the immigration 'issue'. Mainstream parties therefore face a series of challenges stemming from immigration's multifaceted nature, and how it resists being pinned down to a particular fault-line. In turn this lends itself to a variety of framing challenges (Lahav and Courtenmanche, 2012) such that parties may get it electorally 'wrong'. Attempting to internalise 'new' issues into 'old' cleavages (Hooghe et al, 2002) proves difficult should there be intraparty disagreements on dimensional fit and societal impact, leading to a crystallising of any inherent ideological tensions (van Kersbergen and Krouwel, 2008) .
Should one accept the existence of multiple dimensions, and if parties adopt multiple positions, will this generate a set of conflicting ideological 'pulls' when engaging with a cross-cutting issues like immigration? These strains should emerge when parties' stances on state-market relations (State Interventionist (SI) The framing challenges presented by immigration therefore captures tensions between the FM and TAN aspects of some centre-right parties, and the SI and GAL facets that are equally characteristic for some centre-left parties.
The article is laid out as follows. We first survey how the societal cleavages have changed, and whether these shifts impact on party competition, system dimensionality, and on the relationship between 'ideology' and 'immigration'. Our research questions, case selection rationale, methodology and operationalisation are then discussed and, finally, we present findings from a manifesto analysis which are related to a new set of qualitative data (interviews with British and Swedish MPs and party strategists).
While our data suggest ideology to still 'matter', it matters in different ways for different parties. Class-based parties, especially, tend to find the immigration 'issue' more difficult to deal with than those stemming from the liberal-conservative
tradition. Yet post-material parties also appear to be in a better position to handle the conflicting 'pulls' since they often function outside of the established cleavages. But parties' aggregate positions matter as well. When multi-dimensional positioning suggests corresponding views on the role of the state, the outcome is often fewer framing dilemmas and, consequently, less intra-party conflict over what type of issue the immigration 'issue' constitutes. And institutions matter as well. But somewhat counterintuitively, parties in FPTP-systems experience more difficulties than they do in PR-systems due to the greater need for holding together diverse ideological coalitions to secure the majority vote. And this is despite the fact that the former tends to be associated with valence competition, and a less important role of ideology.
The Changing Nature of the Societal Cleavages
Classifying parties along some form of left-right continuum (Budge, 2000; Giljam and Oscarsson, 1996) is common practice in political science but the meaning of 'left' and 'right' is often so diverse that it is 'multifaceted at best, elusive at worst' (Arian and Shamir, 1983:139) . This elusiveness stems from prevailing discrepancies regarding the meaning, and nature, of the party-ideological space (Huber and Inglehart, 1995) .
The literature is thus characteristically divided between those suggesting a 'new', post-material divide to supersede the 'old', material cleavage (Inglehart, 1997) ; those suggesting the meaning of the 'left-right' divide(s) to be the key change (Kriesi et al, 2006) , and those accepting the existence of multi-dimensional dimensions (Hooghe et al, 2002) . However, what they share is a view that most polities were structured around disagreements in the post-war period with parties on 'the left' favouring e.g.
higher levels of collective ownership; taxation and labour market regulation than parties on 'the right'. Later on these differences concerned degrees of party acceptance for certain life-style and/or individual choices, or the nature of democracy (Inglehart, 1971) but are today increasingly connected to issues of national identity and sovereignty (Hooghe et al., 2002) . Their labels may indeed have changed but these fault lines also appear remarkably static in that the overarching issue still concerns the role of the state, albeit in different spheres. For reasons of parsimony, however, the article uses Hooghe et al's terminology -GAL/TAN -when referring to the non-material dimension.
When the relationship between mainstream parties and the immigration 'issue' is addressed, the literature highlights a variety of variables. These include ideological orientation; the presence/success of anti-immigration parties; the number of asylum claims or the number of migrants, more generally, present in the host society (Rydgren, 2005; Freeman, 1997) . Except for ideology, these factors are 'external' to parties themselves, thereby emphasising their reactions to particular exogenous 'shocks'. Given immigration's complexity, and the associated problems of dimensional fit, we seek to shed light on these internal aspects and how parties deal with the potential problems that can arise. We argue that it is the aggregate dimensional positions that are the main sources of these 'pulls', especially so when it comes to an ideologically ambiguous area such as immigration.
A plurality of cleavages may constitute a challenge for parties when deciding on how -and where -to frame their position(s) (Money, 1999 (Hinnfors et al, 2012) . Allowing for 'uncontrolled' entry potentially creates a new -ethnic -underclass and accordingly splits the indigenous working class. But centre-left parties -particularly the Greens and the reformed Left -also tend to favour generous approaches to asylum seekers (Shuster, 2000) . These underlying tensions require parties to perform a delicate balancing act, and if unsuccessful they are likely to face sustained oppositional criticism (for being too liberal or too restrictive); the potential vote 'theft' by the populist radical right and/or increased uncertainty regarding which electoral strategies to pursue. However, not all parties will experience the same strength of these 'pulls'. (Dalton, 2002) and the degree of 'pull' they experience. 'Visions' may thus be less important in FPTP-systems than they are in PR ones (Green-Pedersen, 2007 While our main focus is analysing party management of an increasingly divisive issue, we also goes beyond the pure case study. Should we not find much evidence for the proposed hypotheses then this will allow for a more broadly applicable phenomenon to be identified (George and Bennett, 2005) regarding the role of ideology for party competition.
Data and Methods
Exploring the hypotheses, we examine how the British and Swedish mainstream 1 has managed these potential strains. In the period covered (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) , both cases experienced different types of migratory pressures (Hampshire, 2013) ; varying degrees of public acceptance for the pursued policies (Freeman, 1997) , and different levels of populist radical right party success at the national level (Mudde, 2004 ). Yet there are also similarities. Parties with an immigration sceptic agenda made noted gains during local and EU level elections (Dahlström and Sundell, 2012; Hayton, 2010) , and the -mainstream party -politics of immigration was marked by increasing levels of conflict regarding third country labour migration coupled with rising concerns over the magnitude of asylum claims Hinnfors et al, 2012) . And both countries experienced the aftermath of '[the] transformation//…//in the political culture of advanced industrial societies' (Inglehart 1971:991) suggesting that their respective parties compete in a space that is, at the very least, twodimensional. Simultaneously, however, Britain continues to operate under a FPTPsystem, at least at the Westminster level, while Sweden has a more 'classic' PRsystem with an electoral threshold. This usually results in single-party governments with a parliamentary majority in the former whereas in the latter, coalitions and parliamentary minorities are the norm. The centripetal forces of the British system are thus said to trump any prevailing party differences and ideological strains which, conversely, should be more distinct and more relevant in the centrifugal Swedish case (Sartori, 1976 ). Yet these supply and demand, and institutional differences, do not provide much theoretical nor empirical foundation to explain why parties would experience an internal ideological conflict when considering their stances on immigration.
But we first need to establish positions in the two-dimensional space. This is done through a manifesto analysis for all mainstream parties represented in their respective national parliaments. Manifestos are here a key data source since they 'inform the electorate about the course of action the party will pursue when elected' (Klingemann, 1987:300) and are as such well suited for investigating degrees of conflict in comparative perspective (Green-Pedersen, 2007) . One should of course be careful to equate 'manifesto' with 'party' position or, even, 'party direction' (Franzmann and Kaiser, 2006) . But as the 'final word' prior to an election, manifestos are nevertheless what parties present to the electorate and often provide the framework for subsequent policy proposals (Walgrave and Nuytemanns, 2009 Pellikaan et al, 2007) and stances on the SI/FM and GAL/TAN-dimensions. (Benoit and Laver, 2007) . The CHES data, conversely, seek to remedy this 'fault' by asking country experts to classify parties along four substantive dimensions -economic; social; loci of decision-making and environmental policyand also adds a 'direct measure of party positions on a general left-right scale' (ibid, p.91). While avoiding the mathematical constraints of the CMP, the CHES findings are also highly dependent on context since 'the substantive meaning of left-right is not constant' (ibid, p. 103). The analysis conducted here develops a measurement tool that is able to 'travel' while also being sensitive to the content, rather than magnitude, of statements. Both data sets are however used as comparative benchmarks to check the overall validity of our calculations.
For coding consistency, continuous inter-reliability checks were carried out.
Statements were initially scored by one author and then passed on to the other to score 'blind'. Some discrepancies were identified through this process, e.g. one author would score (+1) whereas the other would give it a (0). These instances emerged when the concerned quasi-sentences were particularly lengthy, thus prompting a discussion, and occasional re-coding, of the score given.
Quantifying statements accordingly, and then adding them together, provides a positional range from -7 to +7 where the closer to -7 a party is, the more SI/GAL its stance will be. On the other hand, the closer to +7 a party is, the more FM/TAN its position is. We then averaged these positions across the five (UK), and six (SWE) elections to get a 'final' score which are plotted in a two-dimensional scatter diagram ( Figure 1 ).
And, finally, parties are grouped together depending on positional configuration (Table. 1 ). To assess the management of any conflicting 'pulls' the article invokes semistructured interviews with British and Swedish MPs or party strategists (29 in total).
These centred on a set of pre-arranged themes (ideology; policy position(s) and party competition) but also allowed follow-up questions to be asked should answers be vague or off-topic (Devine, 2002).
We drew a purposive sample to ensure maximum variation among those with substantive expertise in the areas we were interested in (Patton, 1980) , and MPs assumed to have particular knowledge of the three themes were initially identified.
The selection criteria included past, and current, memberships of committee/s (e.g.
Labour Market, or Home Affairs); position/s held (e.g. political secretary, or committee chair), and time as an MP. Due to issues of access, we also employed a 'snow-balling' technique (Biernacki and Waldorf, 1981) which led us to interview some former MPs and party strategists.
The interviews employed open-ended questions asked in a balanced fashion, e.g., 'some parties favour more state intervention in the market, while others want more market freedom. How would you describe [party] in these terms?' The interviews were then transcribed following a 'denaturalist' approach removing any 'idiosyncratic elements of speech' (Oliver et al, 2005: 173-74) , and the selected quotes were subsequently checked for relevance before incorporated into the article. As an ethical precaution, all interviewees were informed that the data would be anonymised for future publications. They were also
given the option to view the transcript. In a minority of cases changes were suggested to be made, primarily relating to incorrect spelling of names or places. Some of the validity concerns associated with qualitative data were able to be 'controlled' for,
while others proved more difficult. The material was returned to 'over and over again to see if the constructs, categories, explanations, and interpretations ma[d]e sense' (Patton, 1980: 339) , paying special attention to the latter when the quotes were incorporated. But they were also revisited to try and identify any emerging patterns once the transcripts were compared (e.g. was party ideology portrayed in a similar fashion? Were the effects of immigration understood differently depending on age/role in party?). But whether 'the account [accurately] represent[ed] participants' realities of the social phenomena' (Creswell and Miller, 2000: 124) were more challenging as we had to accept that the information we received was a truthful account of these 'realities'. The article thus invokes a 'mixed methodology', and a 'mixed modelling' approach to the data (Tashakkori and Teddlie, 1998) . 
Findings

FM/TAN-parties
The Conservatives show strong FM-(4.6) but moderate, to centrist, TAN-profiles (0.6). We thus expect it to be 'pulled' by these opposing positions (H1.) but as it also functions in a FPTP-system (H3.) any prevailing tensions may very well be trumped by an emphasis on 'issue ownership' (Green and Hobolt, 2008) . The FM-score was readily acknowledged (e.g. '[W]e are a centre-right party//…//favouring lower taxes, less state intervention, etc.' (Cons. 2)). However, some interviewees also pointed to significant difficulties in assessing where 'the party' stands alluding to ideological inconsistencies between party leaders; between different ministerial posts, and between the party and its membership base (e.g. 'IDS was clearly Thatcherite-right;
Howard was Authoritarian-Thatcherite-right, except in some areas where he was, funnily enough, a bit of a social-liberal.//…//Defence policy is currently a lot more to the right than trade is.' (Cons. 3); 'The membership base is a lot more to the 'right'.' (Cons. 6)). Conversely, the calculated TAN-position corresponds better to the interviewees' understanding of how the party has evolved, especially following Cameron's modernisation push (Bale, 2010; Ellison, 2011) . But although certain features, particularly regarding alternative lifestyles and defence were moderated (e.g. These framing difficulties meant that the party got it electorally 'wrong' on several occasions (e.g. 'Every time that tactic has been made explicit, it has not worked' (Cons 6)).
The Moderates underwent a major transformation in time for the 2006 election and adjusted their views on, e.g., taxation and 'the Swedish model' (Widfeldt, 2007) yet their average score nevertheless places them firmly on the FM-side (4.3).
Questions of state/market-relations appear comparatively easier for the party to deal with (e.g. '[W]e believe in market solutions to economic problems.' (Moderates 3)) ., but the weak TAN-position (0.2) hints at non-economic issues being more challenging The scores may therefore not accurately reflect some of the SI and TAN-remains from Labour's previous incarnation. Asylum migration equally subjected the party to further internal divisions. Partly between ideological commitments, and partly between negotiating how social justice should be applied, and to whom (e.g. 'To be fair to those that genuinely need protection, you have to protect the system.' (Lab 1)).
For the Lib Dems the degree of tension could in fact be stronger given their weak FM-(0.4) but strong GAL-profiles (-3.8) yet any strains should be largely redundant given the institutional setting they are in (H.3). Confirming the former position (e.g. 'I don't want the shops to be run by the state but I don't want private companies to run the railways.' (Lib Dems 1)), the party is also described as 'centre- Opposing ideological stances thus make positioning on immigration a challenge but the SI/GAL-configuration appears more difficult to negotiate than the FM/TAN-combination. While this was expected, we did not fully anticipate the former category to be so much more problematic than the latter (H.1). Parties based around class -and class conflict -may thus find it harder to reconcile immigration's (negative) economic impact with its (positive) socio-cultural effects compared to the (positive) economic but (negative) socio-cultural effects we assumed to cause indecisiveness for the FM/TAN-parties.
The FM/GAL-category was conversely not expected to experience much tension. This was confirmed by all parties, except for Labour where the interviews suggest some SI 'remains' still being present which continue to influence the relationship with immigration. But we also found that ideological tension is not necessarily detrimental but can stimulate further discussion regarding party identity and direction. And, finally, are parties in FPTP-systems less affected by these 'pulls' than they are in PR-systems? On the contrary, what the interviews suggest is that parties -in both cases -are subject to such strains, especially if they have conflicting views on the role of the state (Conservatives; V and SAP), and should any attempts to get balance 'right' not yet have filtered through (Labour).
Conclusion
Our main objective was to establish whether opposing ideological positions -in multi-dimensional spaces -generate any conflicting 'pulls' when parties engage with the immigration 'issue'. Through a manifesto analysis, and being sensitive to the institutional context, we predicted which parties that would be more and less likely to experience such strains. Three hypotheses were then explored using qualitative data from a series of semi-structured interviews. A secondary aim was to assess the alleged decline of 'visions' in political life. If the anticipated strains were not recognised, or perceived as particularly problematic, then this would allow us to make more general conclusions regarding the role of ideology. The findings suggest three developments.
First, ideology (still) matters, but its relevance does not apply equally or in the same way. The identified 'pulls' appear stronger within class-based parties than within liberal-conservative ones -regardless of context. This suggests how the centre-right can have more to gain from emphasising the immigration 'issue' (Bale, 2003) but equally how some centre-left parties may have more to lose should the conversation steer towards welfare state/labour market protectionism, an area increasingly emphasised by the populist radical right.
MP constitutes an anomaly for our study however. The manifesto analysis suggests clear ideological tension but the interviews establish these to be largely absent. As a 'new' left party, it operates according to a different set of ideological parameters making them difficult to characterise and classify. While ideology still 'matters' for the 'Socialist' parties, it appears less relevant, and subsequently less divisive, for this 'post-material' party.
Second, positions (still) matter. Should parties have conflicting views on the role of the state, it usually translates into conflicting views on the effect(s) of immigration as well. They therefore find it difficult to decide on what type of 'issue' it constitutes.
However, the weak TAN-ratings for the Conservatives and the Moderates, raise interesting questions for how variability within each ideological pairing matters for the strength of these 'pulls'. Although spatially close to each other, the FM/TANcombination appears more problematic for the former than it does for the latter.
Degrees of dimensional saliency may of course be important here, and the 'old'
cleavage is usually in the foreground in Swedish politics (Sundberg, 1999) 
whereas in
Britain, it is one of several divides that compete for attention (Hopkins, 2009) For those parties that got the balance 'right' such cross-cutting questions may be less troublesome and thus less likely to cause intra-party divisions, or further fragmentation. While the article supports the premise of competition being increasingly characterised by a series of choices of whether (or not) to emphasise certain positions/issues, it also identifies a potential determinant for this emphasis beyond that posited by 'issue ownership' theory. If parties face increased ideological tension, and should they also get the balance 'wrong', it may not necessarily matter if they own the cross-cutting issue (or not) since the unresolved ideological matters can lead to further confusion regarding party identity and direction.
Third, institutions, and electoral systems in particular, (still) matter and play an important role in this negotiating process. The British data highlight how FPTPsystems more readily encourage broad programmatic appeals where portraying competence often supersedes the experienced 'pulls'. Yet this 'catch-all' approach also increases the necessity to put together ideologically diverse coalitions in order to win a majority, or at least a plurality, of votes. This further emphasises the importance of getting the balance, at least partially, 'right' so as to reconcile any ideological differences. The evidence presented here points to this being a fruitful area of further inquiry but since only one of each system was incorporated, any firm conclusions are premature.
Ideology would thus appear to be alive (Fukuyama, 1992) but instead of providing clarity and direction it often generates very conflicting views, particularly on cross-cutting issues, and especially so when the party-political spaces are characterised by multiple cleavages. Establishing how affected parties are by these 'pulls' helps to explain the more general trend toward selective emphasis -a strategy increasingly associated with 'issue ownership' competition -; why mainstream parties tend to downplay immigration's electoral significance, or how they choose to outright not deal with it.
